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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries had specific obligations to control their 
greenhouse gas emissions, but developing countries did not. The Copenhagen Accord 
ends this distinction. For the first time, all the major economies at Copenhagen pledged to 
take specific individual responsibilities, with Annex I (developed) countries invited to 
submit their targets for emissions reductions and non-Annex I (developing) countries to 
submit their intended mitigation actions. By 31 January 2010 all had submitted their 
pledges to cut or limit their greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, the deadline set by the Copenhagen Accord. 
This has never happened before. 
No doubt, Copenhagen was disappointing to many, particularly given that U.S. 
President Obama pledge’s “yes, we can” had raised high expectations for this meeting. 
However, as argued in Zhang (2009a), international climate negotiations for an 
immediate post-2012 climate regime should not attempt unrealistic goals. With not all of 
the factors discussed in Zhang (2009a) met for a legally binding global agreement, the 
Copenhagen Accord is probably the best that could be achieved. The situation could be 
worse because the negotiations could have completely collapsed. While falling far short 
of the legally binding global agreement, the Accord reflects a political consensus on the 
main elements of the future framework among the major emitters and representatives of 
the main negotiating groups. 
Also for the first time, China was blamed for dragging its feet on international 
climate negotiations, previously the accusations always targeted on U.S. French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy publicly criticized China, saying that China was impeding progress in 
climate talks (Watts 2009). British Energy and Climate Change Secretary Ed Miliband 
(2009) even wrote in The Guardian that China led a group of countries that “hijacked” 
the climate negotiations which had at times presented “a farcical picture to the public”. 
In the run up to and at Copenhagen, China took the initiative to ally with India and other 
major developing countries, took full advantage of being the world’s largest carbon 
emitter, and attempted to secure a deal to its advantage. It is widely reported that China 
walked away “happy”. But that did not come without a high price tag. Whether to admit  3  
or not, China angered allies, abandoned principles that it stuck during two weeks of talks, 
and is likely to stoke anti-China sentiment in Western nations. The too early appearance 
of this sentiment does not do any good to China because it still has to evolve from a large 
country to a country that is truly strong in e.g., science, technology, innovation, economy, 
etc. Officially China was backed by allies like India and Brazil, but they admitted in 
private that this was mainly China’s battle (Graham-Harrison 2009). 
Against this background, in this paper, I will first share my thoughts on China’s 
stance and reactions at Copenhagen. Some reactions are well rooted because of realities 
in China. Some reactions could have been handled more effectively for a better image of 
China, provided that there were good preparations and deliberations. I then address the 
reliability of China’s statistics on energy and GDP, an issue crucial to the reliability of 
China’s carbon intensity commitments. Finally, I discuss flaws in current international 
climate negotiations and close with my suggestion that international climate negotiations 
need to focus on 2030 as the targeted date. 
 
 
2. REFLECTIONS ON CHINA’S STANCE AND RESPONSES 
 
Let me start with the widely reported episode of China rejecting unilateral greenhouse 
gas emissions cut by industrialized countries. In my view, this is one area that China 
could have handled more effectively in Copenhagen. 
Miliband (2009) wrote in The Guardian that “We did not get an agreement on 50 
per cent reductions in global emissions by 2050 or on 80 per cent reductions by 
developed countries. Both were vetoed by China, despite the support of a coalition of 
developed and the vast majority of developing countries”. A furious Angela Merkel, 
German Chancellor, demanded that “Why can’t we even mention our own targets?”. 
Kevin Rudd, Australia’s Prime Minister, was annoyed enough to bang his microphone. 
Brazil’s representative also pointed out how illogical China’s position was (Lynas 2009). 
Being asked in the early hours of 19 December 2009 why a pledge that applied only to 
rich nations and to which all those nations seemed to agree would have vanished from the 
final document, the point person for the Swedish government that was serving the EU  4  
Presidency at that time gave the flat reply after the seconds of what-can-I-say silence: 
“China didn’t like numbers.” (The Economist 2010). 
It is not so hard to understand why China rejected the aforementioned two 
numbers. Needing to cut both global greenhouse gas emissions by 50 percent and that of 
industrialized countries by 80 percent by 2050 means that emissions in developing 
countries are only allowed to increase by 15 percent by 2050 relative to their 1990 levels. 
Given their very low levels in 1990, China considers this unacceptable. There could be a 
misinterpretation here. Some may interpret that a 15 percent increase by 2050 would 
mean that the developing country’s emissions are allowed to only increase by 15 percent 
in any specific year from now on to 2050. This is not correct. Emissions in developing 
countries can be much higher than the level allowed by a 15 percent increase prior to 
2050 and then come down to that proposed allowable level by 2050. Indeed, under the 
450 parts per million of CO2 equivalent scenario, CO2 emissions in China are projected to 
go from 2.2 GtCO2 in 1990 and 6.1 GtCO2 in 2007 to 8.4 GtCO2 in 2020, while the 
corresponding figures for India are estimated to go from 0.6 GtCO2 in 1990 and 1.3 
GtCO2 in 2007 to 1.9 GtCO2 in 2020 (IEA 2009). Relative to their levels in 1990 and 
2007, CO2 emissions in 2020 increase by 282 percent and 37 percent for China and by 
117 percent and 46 percent for India, respectively. More importantly, rejecting a long-
standing, widely reported proposal without putting forward alternatives cast China in a 
very bad light. It led to the impression that rich countries should not even announce their 
unilateral cut, which was at least reported by the Western media. 
As suggested in Zhang (2009c), China should insist on at least 80 percent 
emissions reduction by the developed countries, and in the meantime demand that per 
capita greenhouse gas emissions for all major countries by 2050 should be no more than 
the world’s average at that time. 
There are reasons that explain why China took a tough position at Copenhagen. 
First, China’s CO2 emissions have increased beyond expectations. The U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA 2004) estimated that China’s CO2 emissions were not 
expected to catch up with the U.S., the world’s largest carbon emitter until 2030. 
However, China’s energy use has surged since the turn of this century, almost doubling 
between 2000 and 2007. Despite similar rates of economic growth, the rate of growth in  5  
China’s energy use during this period (9.74 percent per year) has been more than twice 
that of the last two decades in the past century (4.25 percent per year) (National Bureau 
of Statistics of China 2009). As a result, China became already the world’s largest carbon 
emitter in 2007, instead of “until 2030” as estimated as late as 2004. This is partly 
because China failed to keep the expansion of inefficient and highly polluting industries 
under control and to implement its own industrial restructuring and sustainable 
development policies, and but because China is still on a course of rapid industrialization 
and urbanization. This in turn requires the consumption of energy to produce energy-
intensive steels, cement, glasses etc for cars, buildings, houses and public infrastructure 
because China as a large country can not depend entirely on imports as a small country 
can do. Moreover, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are key to employment 
for each country. This is particularly important for China to address its employment 
issues and the maintenance of social stability, because of its huge surplus labor force in 
the world’s most populous country and its not well developed social safety net. SMEs in 
China employ 80 percent of the total working population and produce 60 percent of the 
economic output. They have served as a driving force for China’s economic success over 
the past three decades. Largely dictated by the current level of development in China, 
however, these SMEs use much more, sometimes even more than 100 percent energy to 
produce the same unit of output as their state-owned, large and modern counterparts.    
While China should take the main responsibilities for this, the U.S. had also 
played a role here. At Kyoto, the U.S. had made legally binding greenhouse gas 
emissions commitments. The Kyoto target was seen as not high enough but yet not 
unreasonable given that the U.S. economy would not be disrupted unreasonably. This 
might provide the U.S. some “moral” grounds on which to argue that developing countries 
should take meaningful mitigation action (Zhang 2000). The U.S. commitments at Kyoto 
and the diplomatic and public pressure on China put China in a very uncomfortable 
position. It looked like China would be pressured to take on commitments at much earlier 
date than what China wished (Zhang 2009a). 
This situation changed once the U.S. withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol. The U.S. 
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 not only led current U.S. emissions to be 
well above their 1990 levels but the world also lost eight years of concerted efforts  6  
towards climate change mitigation and adaptation, and it also removed international 
pressure on China to take climate change mitigation actions at a time when the Chinese 
economy was growing rapidly. Coincidentally, beginning 2002 that China reversed a 
declining trend in its energy intensity experienced over the last two decades in the past 
century, experiencing faster energy consumption growth than economic growth (see 
Figure 1). It would be inappropriate to blame this on the U.S., but if the U.S. did not 
withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, for its own concerns for competiveness the U.S. 
would have kept pressuring on China as it did immediately after Kyoto and is doing again, 
China would be constantly alert about its greenhouse gas emissions. As a result, China’s 
actual greenhouse gas emissions would be much lower than their current levels.  
 
Figure 1  Energy use per unit of GDP in China, 1990-2007 (tons of coal equivalent per 
US$ 1000 in 1980 prices) 
Source: Drawn based on China Statistical Yearbook, various years. 



































Adding the rapidly growing CO2 emissions, China has realized increasing 
difficulty in controlling its CO2 emissions. China has incorporated for the first time in its 
five-year economic plan an input indicator as a constraint – requiring that energy use per 
unit of GDP cut by 20 percent during the five-year period running from 2006 to 2010 
(namely, 4.4 percent cut per year). Clearly, the Chinese government was not aware of 
how difficult meeting this energy saving target would be at the time the plan was set, 
because China cut its energy use per unit of GDP by about three quarters between 1980 
and 2000 (Zhang, 2003). The Chinese government may have thought that this trend of the 
1980s and the 1990s would continue. 
However, in 2006, the first year of this energy efficiency drive, while China 
reversed a rise in its energy intensity in the first half of that year, the energy intensity 
only declined by 1.79 percent over the entire year. Although this decline is a first since  8  
2003, it was far short of the targeted 4 percent. Among the 31 Chinese provinces or 
equivalent, only Beijing met that energy-saving goal in 2006, cutting its energy use per 
unit of GDP by 5.25 percent, followed by Tianjin with the energy intensity reduction of 
3.98 percent, Shanghai by 3.71 percent, Zhejiang by 3.52 percent and Jiangsu by 3.50 
percent (NBS et al. 2007).
2 In 2007, despite concerted efforts towards energy saving, the 
country cut its energy intensity by 4.04 percent (NBS et al. 2009). There are still big 
variations in energy-saving performance among the 31 Chinese provinces or equivalent. 
Beijing still took the lead, cutting its energy intensity by 6 percent, followed by Tianjin 
by 4.9 percent and Shanghai by 4.66 percent (NBS et al., 2008). This clearly indicated 
Beijing’s commitments to the 2008 Green Olympic Games. In the meantime, however, 
there were seven provinces whose energy-saving performances were below the national 
average. 2008 was the first year in which China exceeded the overall annualized target 
(4.4 percent) for energy saving, cutting its energy intensity by 4.59 percent (NBS et al. 
2009) or 5.2 percent if the upward GDP revision was factored into consideration. This 
was due partly to the economic crisis that reduced the overall demand, in particular the 
demand for energy-intensive products. Overall, China’s energy intensity was cut by 10.1 
percent in the first three years of the plan relative to its 2005 levels. This suggests that the 
country needs to achieve almost the same overall performance in the remaining two years 
as it did in the first three years in order to meet that national energy intensity target. It 
will certainly not be easy to achieve that goal. 
These reductions in China’s energy intensity have already factored in the 
revisions of China’s official GDP data from the second nationwide economic census, part 
of the government’s continuing efforts to improve the quality of its statistics, whose 
accuracy has been questioned by both the general public inside of China and many 
analysts both inside and outside of China. Such revisions show that China’s economy 
grew faster and shifted more towards services than the previously estimated, thus 
benefiting the energy intensity indicator. Even so, it is still not easy for China to achieve 
its own set energy-saving goal. If there were no upward revisions of GDP data, it would 
                                                 
2 Beijing is the first provincial region in China to establish in 2006 the bulletin system to 
release data on energy use and water use per unit of GDP, quarterly releasing these and 
other indicators by county. See Zhang (2007b,c) for detailed discussion on why Beijing 
met but the country missed the energy-saving goals.  9  
be impossible at all to meet that target. I will return to the statistical issues later when 
taking about verification, the issue that is of greatest concern to the U.S. and other 
industrialized countries at Copenhagen. 
Thirdly, there are profound implications of government decentralization. Over the 
past three decades, China has decentralized with respect to allocation and responsibility 
and has shifted control over resources and decision-making to local governments. This 
devolution of decision-making to local levels has placed environmental stewardship in 
the hands of local officials who typically are more concerned with economic growth than 
the environment (Zhang 2007a and 2008). As is often the case, what the center wants is 
not necessarily what the center gets, as in the old Chinese saying, “The mountains are 
high, and the emperor is far away”.  
In addition to the distorted evaluation criterion for officials on which local 
officials typically have been promoted based on how fast they expand their local 
economies, objectively speaking, the current fiscal system in China plays a part in driving 
local governments to seek higher GDP growth at the expense of the environment. This is 
because that tax-sharing system makes it hard to reconcile the interests of the central and 
local governments (Zhang 2008 and 2009b). Since the tax-sharing system was adopted in 
China in 1994, taxes are grouped into taxes collected by the central government, taxes 
collected by local governments, and taxes shared between the central and local 
governments. All those taxes that have steady sources and broad bases and are easily 
collected, such as the consumption tax, tariffs, vehicle purchase tax, are assigned to the 
central government. VAT and income tax are split between the central and local 
governments, with 75 percent of VAT and 60 percent of income tax going to the central 
government. As a result, the central government revenue increased by 200 percent in 
1994 relative to its 1993 level. This led the share of the central government in the total 
government revenue to go up to 55.7 percent in 1994 from 22.0 percent in the previous 
year (see Table 1). In the meantime, the share of the central government in the total 
government expenditure just rose by 2 percent. By 2008, local governments only 
accounted for 46.7 percent of the total government revenue, but their expenditure 
accounted for 78.7 percent of the total government expenditure in China. To enable to 
pay their expenditure for culture and education, supporting agricultural production, social  10 
security subsidiary, etc., local governments have little choice but to focus on local 
development and GDP. That will in turn enable them to enlarge their tax revenue by 
collecting urban maintenance and development tax, contract tax, arable land occupation 
tax, urban land use tax, etc. 
 
 
Table 1  Shares of the central and local governments in the total government revenue and 
expenditure in China, 1993-2008 
 






























































































Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2009).  11 
 
The factors described are far from comprehensive, but they are sufficient enough 
to illustrate great challenges ahead for China and constraints on its development and 
climate commitments. Of course, the above discussion does not justify no further action 
by China. Rather, given the fact that China is already the world’s largest carbon emitter 
and its emissions will continue to rise rapidly as it is approaching becoming the world’s 
largest economy, China is seen to have greater capacity, capability and responsibility. The 
country is facing great pressure both inside and outside international climate negotiations 
to exhibit greater ambition in limiting its greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, China will 
continue to be confronted with the threats of trade measures, as long as it does not signal 
well ahead the time when it will take on the emissions caps (Zhang 2009c,d). 
Indeed, there are many things that China can do to reduce its own carbon footprint. 
To that end, just prior to the Copenhagen climate summit, China pledged to cut its carbon 
intensity by 40-45 percent by 2020 relative its 2005 level. A lot of discussion has since 
focused on whether such a pledge is ambitious or just represents business as usual. China 
considers it very ambitious, whereas Western scholars view it just business as usual. 
Objectively speaking, it is somewhere in between. It would not be seen as ambitious as 
China argues. Zhang (2009c) suggests that China should aim a 45-50 percent cut in its 
carbon intensity over the period 2006-2020. But it is certainly not just representing 
business as usual. Based on the National Development and Reform Commission, China’s 
top economic planning agency, China had cut its energy intensity by 14.38 percent in the 
first four years (2006-2009) of the 11
th five-year plan relative to its 2005 levels. As 
discussed above, it has been challenging for China to have achieved this to date, and 
China is facing great difficulty meeting its own set 20 percent energy-saving goal by 
2010. The new carbon intensity target set for 2020 requires additional 20-25 percent on 
top of the existing target. It poses an additional challenge for China. But for me, while the 
level of China’s commitments is crucial in affecting the level and ambition of 
commitments from other countries, most important is whether the claimed carbon 
emissions reductions are real. This raises reliability issues concerning China’s statistics 
on energy and GDP. 
  12 
 
3. MEETING CHINA’S CARBON INTENSITY: THE RELIABILITY ISSUE OF 
CHINA’S STATISTICS ON ENERGY AND GDP 
 
China is not known for the reliability of its statistics (e.g., Rawski 2001). China’s refusal 
to budge on U.S. and other industrialized country’s demands for greater transparency and 
checks at Copenhagen was cited by negotiator after negotiator as a key block to reaching 
a deal. As long as China’s pledges are in the form of carbon intensity, the reliability of 
both emissions and GDP data matters. 
Assuming the fixed CO2 emissions coefficients that convert consumption of fossil 
fuels into CO2 emissions, the reliability of emissions data depends very much on energy 
consumption data. Unlike the energy data in the industrial product tables in the China 
Statistical Yearbook, the statistics on the primary energy production and consumption are 
usually revised in the year after their first appearance. As would be expected, the 
adjustments made to production statistics are far smaller than those made to consumption 
statistics, because it is usually easier to collect information on a small number of energy 
producers than a large number of energy consumers. Table 2 shows the preliminary and 
final values for total primary energy consumption and coal consumption in China 
between 1990 and 2008. Until 1996 revisions of total energy use figures were several 
times smaller than in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The preliminary figures for total 
energy use in 1999-2001 were revised upwards by 8-10 percent. In all three years, these 
adjustments were driven by the upward revisions of 8-13 percent made to the coal 
consumption figures to reflect the unreported coal production mainly from small, 
inefficient and highly polluting coal mines that were ordered to shut down through a 
widely-publicized nationwide campaign beginning in 1998 but many of which had 
reopened because in many cases localities had backtracked to preserve local jobs and 
generate tax revenues as well as personal payoffs. In recent years, preliminary figures for 
energy use are almost the same as the final reported ones. 
 
  13 
Table 2  Preliminary and final values for total primary energy consumption and coal 
consumption in China, 1990-2008 
 























































































































































Notes: Mtce (million tons of coal equivalent). 
* Data on energy and coal consumption in 2008 are preliminary value. 
Source: Based on China Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
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Similarly, China first releases its preliminary GDP figures and then revises them. 
These revised GDP figures for the years 2005-2008 are further verified based on the 
second agricultural census released in February 2008 and the second nationwide 
economic census released in December 2009. With upward revisions of both GDP and 
the share of services, there is a wide variation between the preliminary value for China’s 
energy intensity and the final reported one. As shown in Table 3, such revisions lead to a 
differential between preliminary and final values as large as 45.5 percent for the energy 
intensity in 2006. With the government’s continuing efforts to improve the quality of 




Table 3 A reduction in China’s energy intensity: preliminary value versus final value
a 
 
Year Preliminary  value 
(%) 









1.23 (March 2007) 
3.27 (March 2008) 
4.59 (30 June 2009) 
3.98
c (March 2010) 
1.33 (12 July 2007) 
3.66 (14 July 2008) 
5.2
b (25 December 2009) 
1.79 (14 July 2008) 






a The dates when the corresponding data were released are in parentheses.  
b Based on China’s revised 2008 GDP from the second nationwide economic census, 
which raised the growth rate of GDP to 9.6 percent from the previously reported 9 
percent for that year and the share of services in GDP. 
c Own calculation based on the National Development and Reform Commission’s 
reporting that China’s energy intensity was cut by 14.38 percent in the first four years of 
the 11
th five-year plan relative to its 2005 levels.  15 
 
 
From the preceding discussion, it thus follows that GDP figures are even more 
crucial to the impacts on the energy or carbon intensity than energy consumption and 
emissions data. At Copenhagen, China eventually compromised to agree to open 
emission data to international consultation and analysis. The EU has identified building a 
robust and transparent emissions and performance accounting framework as a key 
element of implementing the Copenhagen Accord (European Commission 2010). How all 
this will be worked out remains to be seen. China has not agreed on opening its GDP 
figures to international consultation and analysis. But as long as China’s commitments 
are in the form of carbon intensity, establishing a robust and transparent emissions and 
performance accounting framework is helpful, but not enough to remove international 
concern about the reliability of China’s commitments. The aforementioned revisions of 
China’s GDP figures reflect part of the government’s continuing efforts to improve the 
accuracy and reliability of China’s statistics on economic activity. They have nothing to 
do with the energy intensity indicator, and are certainly not calculated to make that 
indicator look good to the government’s advantage, although practically they benefit the 
energy intensity indicator. But such revisions have huge implications for meeting China’s 
existing energy-saving goal in 2010 and its proposed carbon intensity target in 2020. 
 
 
4. A WAY FORWARD 
 
Now let us see how to go from here. For me, the U.S. Congress passing a climate bill to 
cap U.S. greenhouse gas emissions has more impact on the future levels of greenhouse 
gas emissions than China’s current stance. As long as commitments from the world’s two 
largest greenhouse gas emitters differ in form, the U.S. Senate seems unlikely to pass a 
bill to cap its emissions without imposing strict carbon tariffs, and China is constantly 
confronted with the threats of trade measures whenever the U.S. Senate is shaping its 
climate bill (Zhang 2009d).  16 
This dilemma is partly attributed to flaws in current international climate 
negotiations, which have been focused on commitments on the two targeted dates: 2020 
and 2050 (Zhang 2009d). However, with the commitment period only up to 2020, there is 
a very little room left for the U.S. and China, although for reasons very different from 
each other.  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) calls for cutting global 
greenhouse gas emissions at least in half by 2050. To achieve that goal, the IPCC fourth 
assessment report recommends that global greenhouse gas emissions should peak by 
2020 at the latest and then turn downward in order to avoid dangerous climate change 
consequences, calling for developed countries to cut their greenhouse gas emissions by 
25-40 percent by 2020 relative to their 1990 levels. This recommendation was 
incorporated into the Bali Roadmap at the United Nations Climate Summit in 2007. This 
seems a logical choice. Once the long-term goal (namely target for 2050) is set, one 
needs a mid-term goal to help facilitate the long-term one. From then, the negotiations on 
industrialized countries’ commitments have been on what emissions reduction targets 
would be in 2020. However, the problem with this date is that it does not accommodate 
well the world’s two largest greenhouse gas emitters, namely the U.S. and China. 
Because the U.S. withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol, it has not made any substantial 
preparations to cut emissions as other Kyoto-constrained industrialized countries have 
done over the past decade. Whether you like it or not, this is a political reality. It is very 
hard for a unprepared country like the U.S. to take on a substantial emissions cut in 2020 
as developing countries have demanded. 
In the meantime, China overtook the U.S. to become the world’s largest 
greenhouse gas emitter in 2007, at least twenty years earlier than what was estimated as 
late as 2004. IEA (2009) estimates that about half of the growth of global energy-related 
CO2 emissions until 2030 will come from China. Combined with huge trade deficit with 
China, the U.S. has pushed for China to take on emissions caps as early as 2020. 
Otherwise, the goods from China to U.S. markets will be subject to carbon tariffs. 
However, as argued in Zhang (2009c,d), the year 2020 is not a realistic date for China to 
take the absolute emissions cap.  17 
Meanwhile, taking on something for 2050 seems too far away for politicians. In 
my view, if the commitment period were extended to 2030, it would really open up the 
possibility for the U.S. and China to make the commitments that each wants from the 
other in the same form, although the scale of reductions would differ from each other. By 
2030, the U.S. will be able to commit to much deeper emission cuts that China and other 
developing countries have demanded, while, as argued in Zhang (2009c,d), China would 
have approached the threshold to take on the absolute emission cap that the U.S. and 
other industrialized countries have long asked for. Being aware of his proposed 
provisional target in 2020 well below what is internationally expected from the U.S., 
President Obama announced a provisional target of a 42 percent reduction below 2005 
levels in 2030 to demonstrate the U.S. continuing commitments and leadership to find a 
global solution to the threat of climate change. While the U.S. proposed level of emission 
reductions for 2030 is still not ambitious enough, President Obama inadvertently points 
to the right direction of international climate negotiations. They need to look at the 
targeted date of 2030. If international negotiations could lead to much deeper emission 
cuts for developed countries as well as the absolute emission caps for major developing 
countries in 2030, that would significantly reduce the legitimacy of the U.S. proposed 
carbon tariffs and, if implemented, their prospect for withstanding a challenge before 
WTO. That will also alleviate concern about when China’s greenhouse gas emissions 
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